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Origins
Writing about the ‘uneasy relationship’ between popular music and 
television, Simon Frith argues that
it was only with the emergence of cable television in the 1980s that a 
music television service was developed with anything like the day-to-day 
significance of music radio. Music television, MTV, duly aped Top 40 
radio formats, with playlists, veejays, ‘hot’ releases, ‘breaking’ singles, etc. 
(2002, p.279)
The Chart Show was a weekly UK TV programme showcasing music 
videos from the Media Research Information Bureau (MRIB) Network 
Chart and a range of independent and specialist pop music charts. It 
began broadcasting on Friday evenings on Channel 4 in April 1986 
and ran for three series until September 1988. Its production company, 
Video Visuals, subsequently found a new home for The Chart Show 
with Yorkshire Television on ITV, where it went out on Saturday 
mornings between January 1989 and August 1998. What made the 
show unique in the British broadcasting context was that it was the 
first presenter-less pop chart programme that showcased popular music 
exclusively in video form. Beginning at a time when MTV was still 
unavailable in the UK, The Chart Show was innovatory in consolidating 
music video as the lingua franca of the pop singles market. Drawing on 
archival sources from Channel 4, and the trade and popular music 
presses, this article shows how The Chart Show helped shape the form 
of music video, contributed to its commercial status, boosted singles 
sales, and drove industry demand and production schedules. It argues 
that an appreciation of music video is dependent upon the historical 
specificity of its broadcast context.
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Although, of course, the relationship between television, popular music, 
and youth culture has a much longer history (see Frith, 1996; Mundy, 
1999; Inglis, 2010), Frith (2002) identifies the moment of MTV as its 
coming-of-age, largely by dint of its borrowing from the established formats 
of radio. But MTV’s other major innovation was that it ‘immediately 
privileged the form of the video clip over the live performance’ (Huq, 
2010, p.113), appearing to resolve the particular problem of ‘liveness’ in 
music performance (see Auslander, 1999) that had dogged pop TV shows 
since the late 1950s (and had in part given rise to the pop promo as a 
consequence). Additionally, as Pat Aufderheide’s early assessment claimed, 
‘The [US] success of MTV has been based on an understanding that 
the channel offers not videos but environment, a context that creates 
mood’ (1986, p.63). Furthermore, in terms of scholarship, the advent of 
MTV defined the way in which music video as a form was understood. 
Steve Jones reflects:
Scholarly interest was not so much placed in music videos per se as it 
was in music videos on MTV. Such placement was appropriate, for it 
was in the context of MTV, a particularly commercial context aimed 
toward creating MTV as a brand that would carry with it aspects of 
commercial culture, that the logics of viewing music video operated. 
(2005, p.86–87)
All of these elements (MTV’s pop radio format, its privileging of the 
video clip, its creation of environment and its commercial brand) shaped 
a definition of the channel as quintessentially postmodern (see Aufderheide, 
1986; Fiske, 1986; Wollen, 1986; Kaplan, 1987; Goodwin, 1993).
Andrew Goodwin conversely, has argued for a more historically 
grounded account of the role of television in framing music video (1993). 
He points out that despite its subsequent cultural influence, MTV’s 
initial appeal was limited, especially overseas. MTV was a cable service 
and the particularly slow roll-out of cable and satellite provision in the 
UK meant that its screen impact was muted.1 Paul Bonner reports: ‘It 
was not until the mid-1990s, after the arrival in the UK of massive 
North American capital and know-how, that cable technology could 
reach the sort of maturity that broadcast technology has reached by the 
end of the 1970s’ (Bonner & Aston, 2003, p.412). Indeed, in its first 
phase, between its New York launch on 1 August 1981, its acquisition 
by Viacom, Inc. in 1985, and the inception of MTV Europe from 
Amsterdam in 1987, it had a far greater impact on British music 
video producers (in stimulating demand and showcasing British acts 
in the US) than it did on UK audiences. Goodwin notes that ‘MTV 
in this period was identified heavily with the so-called second “British 
1 From 1984 to 1987 
Music Box was a music 
satellite and cable channel 
sponsored by Richard 
Branson’s Virgin that 
sought to offer a version 
of MTV for the European 
market.
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Invasion” of synth-pop acts’ (1993, p.49). It wasn’t until the 1990s that 
MTV made any significant inroads in the UK with an all-time high 
viewing share of 1.6 per cent in 1992 (BARB, 2016). By December 
1996, when the MTV Europe Music Awards were held in London for 
the first time, the lacklustre atmosphere of the event reported by trade 
magazine Promo, ‘may have had something to do with the non-essential 
nature of MTV in the pop life of the UK’:
Viewing figures for MTV in the UK have been nothing to write home 
about, to say the least. Its previous pan-European nature is obviously 
one reason. Another is probably something to do with the format. 
Unlike in the US, where the advent of MTV introduced something 
distinctly different and leftfield from mainstream TV, MTV has not 
had the same impact in Britain against terrestrial channels (which has 
far more pop music than you would find on American terrestrial). 
(Knight 1996c, p.13)
Thus, while these accounts all recognise the primary significance of MTV 
in music video history, they also acknowledge that its influence was never 
universally pervasive. It follows that any history of music video needs to 
take account of broadcast contexts other than MTV.
This article concentrates on the UK context, where back in 1986 the 
way was left clear for the development of a homegrown version of MTV 
on terrestrial television to rival the BBC’s long-running chart show Top of 
the Pops (1964–2006). Although Top of the Pops had shown an increasing 
proportion of music videos since the mid-1970s, its staple format remained 
the live studio appearance of pop acts singing and miming instrumentals 
to a playback, and successive BBC producers were wary of the nascent 
impact of music video on the presenter-orchestrated studio space with its 
herded gaggle of a captive audience. By the time producer Paul Ciani 
took over from Brian Whitehouse in 1989 the show’s studio immediacy 
was an orthodoxy robustly defended:
The record companies should get their act together and get the bands 
available for appearing on Top of the Pops – it’s going to be the choice 
between almost a full number if you appear live and half, or even 
less, of a track if it’s a promo you’re offering […] I don’t see why we 
should waste prime air time by putting them out. 
(1988, p.4)
So despite the rise of music video, that studio format had shown itself 
to be durable and the show still commanded an audience of between 
10 and 12 million, compared with The Tube (Channel 4, 1982–1987) that 
struggled to muster a million by 1986 (Frith, 1996, p.68).
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Yet having identified the youth market as a primary target for exploi-
tation in a rapidly changing international television landscape, broadcasters 
from the mid-1980s were looking for new ways to capitalise on popular 
music’s lingua franca. As Simon Frith has documented:
For the new European television services, youth programming meant 
music programming from the start, and this equation also reflected 
the increasing music industry investment in television. Britain’s three 
biggest independent rock labels, Virgin, Island and Chrysalis, were, by 
the mid-1980s, equally involved in television. 
(1993, p.70)
In 1982 the UK’s new fourth channel, in keeping with its remit to be 
innovative in programme form and content, had launched The Tube as a 
Friday night antidote to Top of the Pops. Broadcasting live from a regional 
base in Newcastle, its unstructured, unscripted, and sometimes unruly 
‘liveness’ became notorious, and the opportunity it offered to unsigned 
and uncharted new talents was unprecedented. By 1985, Channel 4’s 
commissioning editor for youth programmes, John Cummins (who had 
been a researcher on The Tube before replacing Mike Bolland in March 
1984), was looking for a new chart show format for 1986 to fill the 
Friday night early evening slot between series of The Tube; he commis-
sioned some research.
The brief was that a new show should avoid copying Top of the Pops, 
but should seek to exploit the established appeal of pop charts and chart 
facts, and would draw on the MRIB chart data used for The Network 
Chart Show (produced by Capital Radio) which had already proved a 
popular rival to BBC Radio One’s Top 40 Chart across the independent 
radio network since its launch in September 1984. The MRIB chart 
differed from the BBC’s ‘official chart’ (compiled by Gallup) in that it 
used airplay data in addition to sales figures (sometimes with surprisingly 
different results).
Producer of The Tube, Jill Sinclair, arrived at two alternative proposals, 
‘following intensive investigations and endless discussions with a number 
of interested parties’ (Sinclair, 1986, n.p.). Option one was a conventional 
studio-based show which would be presenter-fronted with a ‘hand-picked, 
natch’ audience, and would feature, like Top of the Pops, a mixture of 
appearances by artists miming to ‘specially re-recorded’ playback and 
music video inserts. Its distinctive aspect, however, would be in drawing on 
positions 40–75 of the Network Chart and featuring ‘live acts and videos 
from other charts: USA, Disco, Indie, Reggae, Compact Disc’. Because 
it would go out on a Friday, unlike Top of the Pops, it would predict and 
preview high climbers and new entries in the following week’s chart:
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By previewing sure chart entries it would still be possible to include 
the likes of Wham! and Duran Duran, but there would be more 
scope and a greater need to spot the less obvious potential hits and 
feature bands in the lower reaches who aren’t exposed on television 
as a matter of course.
(Sinclair, 1986, n.p.)
Refreshing as this approach to the charts might have been, the challenges 
of this model were cost, finding the right presenter, and studio space. 
It was left to Music Week, in early 1986, to speculate that this new 
programme might be fronted by DJ David ‘Kid’ Jensen (who hosted the 
Capital Radio show) and might be produced by Tyne Tees television (who 
made The Tube) (Anon., 1986a, p.1).2
Option two was a Top 40 video show – the brainchild of director 
Keith Macmillan. Macmillan’s career had begun as a stills photographer 
for album sleeves, before he graduated to directing concert tours (making 
over 30 concert films, notably Bob Marley’s Exodus) and pop promos 
(winning a BAFTA for Paul McCartney’s ‘Pipes Of Peace’ [1983]) (Anon., 
2006). Between 1976 and 1984 Macmillan and his business partner Philip 
Davey produced more than 600 promos, and they set up the first US 
video production company in Hollywood in 1979. Macmillan’s venture into 
TV began with Channel 4’s 1985 presenter-less, live Heavy Metal show 
Extra Celestial Transmission (ECT.) (Anon., 1996c, p.3–4). Nine months later 
his plan for a new chart video programme would guarantee a screening 
(in part or in whole) to all the climbers and highest new entries in the 
Network Chart and would also feature ‘the best and most interesting 
videos’ in other charts (as option one). In this model, the video would 
be centre stage, and Sinclair expressed some concerns about ‘the inability 
to include much of the indie chart (because they don’t all have videos)’. 
Furthermore, although this option would be, radically, presenter-less, it 
would need ‘a strong editorial line’ because it ‘would be more at the 
mercy of the record-buying public […] and unimaginative video makers’ 
(Sinclair, 1986, n.p.).
Intrinsic to this format, therefore, was not only its new approach to 
chart data but, implicitly, quality judgements about music videos as a 
form – a form which Simon Frith suggests, ‘foregrounds the performance 
of music rather than the music itself’ (1996, p.225). Yet Frith goes on 
to make claims for the relative autonomy afforded by music videos 
‘because they enable musicians (or their record companies) to translate 
their performing ideals into televisual terms directly, without having to 
be mediated by the established norms of TV entertainment’ (p.225).
Jill Sinclair expressed a rather different view, proposing that while this 
format would showcase the best new videos, ‘it must also be permissible 
2 This show became The 
Roxy (1987–1988) which 
was produced by Tyne 
Tees following the demise 
of The Tube and fronted 
by David Jensen and 
Kevin Sharkey. But it was 
dropped after one series.
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to pass comment on the worst ones (fast-forward in vision?)’ – mediation 
indeed. Significantly, although when option two was commissioned as The 
Chart Show it incorporated those computer graphics and on-screen VCR 
controls Sinclair had suggested (‘finding a linking idea using graphics 
and computer animation’), it stopped short of the heavy-handed editorial 
techniques she recommended. Overall Sinclair divined that this option, 
which drew in part on the graphic originality of video-makers Annabel 
Jankel and Rocky Morton’s avatar Max Headroom (Channel 4, 1985–1987), 
and was in part ‘comparable to MTV – but better’, presented ‘an 
opportunity to try an entirely new variation on a theme’ (Sinclair, 1986, 
n.p.). The Chart Show certainly proved to illustrate a totally new engagement 
of television with popular music, wherein the nature of music video as 
a form, and a commercial and legal entity, would be defined in ways 
significantly different from MTV (outlined above) but on terms that would 
be no less hotly contested.3
The Format
Keith Macmillan’s Video Visuals was duly commissioned to produce a 
show with the unpromising working title ‘The Vidiots’ on the basis of 
a pitch that read:
26 x 60’ shows combining music videos and state of the art computer 
animation, which is used to link latest hit music videos in a series of 
comic incidents & running gags. Content chart based with regular 
exclusive showings of videos. 
(Channel 4 Television, 1986)
It was to be broadcast on Friday evenings between 17:30 and 18:30 
beginning on 11 April 1986. Macmillan would direct and executive 
produce; Jill Sinclair would be the producer. As it turned out, the implicitly 
satirical, tongue-in-cheek character of the show (perhaps combining the 
surrealism of The Kenny Everett Video Show (ITV, 1978–1981) with the 
sardonic wit of Max Headroom) was diminished in favour of computer 
graphics framing devices designed by Electric Image (in bright, primary 
colours and geometric lines) that allowed the videos to speak for themselves 
and foregrounded the lively competition of chart performance. The artists, 
Macmillan insisted, were the stars of the show: ‘The graphics don’t 
compete with them – they’re like visual punctuation marks’ (Anon, 1996c, 
p.4).
The first episode opened with INXS ‘What You Need’ (1985), followed 
by the Heavy Metal singles chart featuring ZZ Top’s ‘Rough Boy’ (1985) 
and Van Halen’s ‘Why Can’t This Be Love?’ (1986). The Network Albums 
3 For more on the terms 
by which MTV defined 
music video aesthetically, 
commercially, and legally 
see especially Aufderheide 
(1986); Banks (1996); Jones 
(2005).
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chart showcased A-ha’s Hunting High and Low with their video for ‘Train 
Of Thought’ (1985) and Prince’s Parade album with his single-release 
‘Kiss’ (1986). Part one concluded with a ‘video reveal’ of Jean-Michel 
Jarre’s ‘Fourth Rendez-vous’ (1986). Part two ran through the Dance 
Chart, the Indie Chart, and the Reggae chart highlighting, respectively, 
‘Secret Lovers’ (1985) by Atlantic Starr, ‘Shellshock’ (1986) by New Order, 
and ‘Hello Darling’ (1986) by Tippa Irie. More ‘video reveals’ screened 
Madonna’s ‘Live To Tell’ (1986) and Depeche Mode’s ‘A Question Of 
Lust’ (1986). The show then built to its climax by featuring three from 
the Network Chart: Gary Numan with ‘This Is Love’ (1986) (New 
Entry at 39), Big Country’s ‘Look Away’ (1986) (High Climber at 10) 
and ‘All The Things She Said’ by Simple Minds (1986) (High Climber 
at 5). And it ended with what became the show’s first incarnation, a 
familiar chart prediction competition. On-screen captions over an old 
silent slapstick comedy excerpt invited viewers to ‘Predict the Order of 
the Top Three and Win a Great Prize’, reminding them: ‘Important! You 
must post your prediction by noon TOMORROW… To see if you are 
right listen to the Network Chart Show on Independent Radio at 5pm 
on Sunday’. The first week’s contenders were: Cliff & The Young Ones 
and ‘Living Doll’ (1986), George Michael’s ‘A Different Corner’ (1986) and 
the Euro-Baroque ‘Rock Me Amadeus’ (1985) by Falco. It was already 
‘Living Doll’s’ third week at Number 1 and it duly gave way to George 
Michael who held the spot for the subsequent three weeks, only to be 
eclipsed finally by Falco on 10 May. Thus a formula was established 
that proved, with minor adjustments, to be both popular and enduring.
The Chart Show immediately attracted an audience of 1.2 million that 
it maintained, more or less, throughout its twelve-year run. Indeed, by its 
third series on Channel 4, in March 1988, it was consistently drawing 
audiences of over 2 million. Not in the Top of the Pops league perhaps, 
but very respectable for Channel 4.
Yet if the show’s presentation of its video content appeared dutiful 
enough (with the fast-forward and rewind mock VCR controls used like 
juke box navigation as a means of selecting rather than dismissing) its 
creator Keith Macmillan, like producer Jill Sinclair, maintains its editorial 
function was paramount:
We are aggressively editorial. It doesn’t look it if you’re just a casual 
viewer, but if you look closely we’re not really a chart show. We’re 
chart-based because we feature things like the independent chart, the 
metal chart and dance chart. No-one else on television does that, so 
I think we’ve got a real good reason for being there. 
(Quoted in Sweeting, 1988)
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The pop press by and large agreed. John McCready, writing in New 
Musical Express, enthused:
It’s taken us a long time to get there but this blur of current money-
makers is perfect. It understands pop implicitly […] The video material 
is treated with a healthy lack of respect. The Chart Show races through 
pop like it’s everything and nothing […] It’s the point at which television 
has come to terms with the simplicity pop demands. 
(McCready, 1987)
Mike Davies of For The Record admired the construction: ‘Undoubtedly 
the slickest piece of video editing ever to grace a pop music show ( just 
watch how it segues from promo to promo, graphic to graphic with the 
skill of the most consummate DJ mixer)’ (Davies, 1988).
In featuring ‘specialist’ charts, the programme not only provided a 
broader spectrum of music, but was instrumental in breaking new bands, 
whether they had videos or not. Rupa Huq recalls something of its impact:
It was in the indie chart slot that I was exposed to the sight of New 
Order’s ‘True Faith’ video, directed and choreographed by French mime 
artist Philippe Decouflé (featuring colourfully-attired dancers in inflatable 
suits turning somersaults and slapping one another) and the ramshackle 
amateur-looking video of ‘Rules And Regulations’ by Birmingham lo-fi 
guitar girl band We’ve Got A Fuzzbox And We’re Going To Use 
It: within three years, they were appearing on Top Of The Pops as a 
polished girl group, signed to WEA. The Soup Dragons effected a 
similar change in career direction between their early appearances on 
The Chart Show (performing ‘Soft As Your Face’) and their later chart 
success with ‘I’m Free’, issued on the back of the Madchester indie 
boom in 1990. The indie segment of The Chart Show (and Channel 4 
itself ) were sometimes subject to moments where still-photos covered 
up for a lack of moving content: in its infancy, there were sometimes 
insufficient advertisers to fill a commercial break, necessitating the 
onscreen display of the programme’s logo to the sounds of musak. 
Similarly, indie chart acts without a video (such as House of Love’s 
‘Destroy The Heart’) had to be content with a simple photograph of 
the band to accompany their songs. 
(2010, p.115)
As Huq documents, the show was innovative in the way it assembled and 
presented music video and injected significant variety into the complexion 
of chart music. To redeploy Aufderheide’s terms, its environment was slick 
and tech-savvy, its mood was colourful and carefree; in short it created 
a contemporary, palatable, and popular commercial pop aesthetic capable 
of embracing the extremes of Psychic TV’s ‘Godstar’ (1985) and Robert 
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Palmer’s ‘Addicted To Love’ (1985). The Chart Show seemed well-positioned 
to drive up the quantity and quality of music video on UK television, 
ensuring that the video became a necessary promotional currency for 
commercial success across a spectrum of music genres.
Formal Effects
It may be useful at this point to suggest some conceptual terms in order 
to understand better The Chart Show’s innovation in weekly, chart-based, 
presenter-less, pop music programming. Its distinctiveness resides in three 
semiotic aspects of its presentation of music video content: aggregation, 
sequencing, and framing. Aggregation is the selection and assimilation 
of separate constituent elements with formal similarities which in this 
case designate music videos as the primary content within a discrete 
45/60minute programme format. Sequencing explains the ordering of 
these individual elements within the linear chronology of a particular 
programme, and the sub-division of that programme into a number of 
distinct lists across two parts separated by a commercial break (different 
chart run-downs, and repeated tags – ‘new entry’, ‘high climber’, 
‘video reveal’ – applied to selected videos). Framing accounts for the 
editorial presentation of the content with extra-textual additions: graphics, 
interstitials, titling, jingles, ‘Fact Files’, and so on. These televisual codes 
are important presentational factors by which TV pop shows compiled 
entirely of music videos had a profound effect on the status of the 
product. Because it was from the word go presenter-less and savvy in 
its editorial élan, whilst remaining within the scheduled framework of 
commercial broadcast television, The Chart Show surpassed even MTV in 
this capacity. Arguably, the combination of these three codes exerted two 
countermanding tendencies: they elevated the individual video clip above 
the status of (for example) a discrete advertisement within the sequence 
of a three-minute commercial break (each separate video was unique); 
and they emphasised the formal status of music video by placing each 
video next to others so that each individual video was made distinctive 
not just on its own audio-visual merits but by dint of its reinforced 
‘music-video-ness’ within a select sequence.
From its first inception one of the defining features of The Chart 
Show was its rapid assembly-to-transmission schedule, something which 
the relationship between Top of the Pops and the UK singles chart could 
not emulate. Channel 4’s weekly press information pack trumpeted the 
show’s unique selling points from Friday 2 May 1986: ‘The programme 
is compiled from data gathered and processed by MRIB and completed 
within three hours of transmission, therefore providing the most immediate 
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and accurate rundown of the charts available’ (Channel 4 Press Packs, 
1986).
In reality, the timeframe for the completion of the show’s second half 
(which covered that week’s singles chart) was more like four-and-a-half 
hours from the chart’s publication at midday on a Friday, through sourcing 
the videos, compiling the chart and editing the show which was then 
delivered by dispatch rider to Channel 4’s offices. Editorial decisions, 
which sometimes went against notable stars (for example Madonna’s ‘The 
Look Of Love’ [1987] didn’t make the cut), had to be exercised under 
pressure from both the production schedule and the relentless pluggers. 
On-screen features like the notoriously illegible ‘Fact Files’ were mixed 
in live as the show went out – they were the closest the programme 
came to editorial commentary.
Popular commercial television has the power not only to deliver 
significant audiences to advertisers, but to influence the structural dynamics 
of the production sector. The Chart Show’s hectic Friday afternoon routine 
determined the production rosters of video makers and ritualised their 
cycles. Its ‘exclusives’ also became a fierce ground for competition in 
the industry. Neil Ferris of Brilliant! PR admired Keith Macmillan’s 
no-nonsense approach:
If they want your video for an exclusive, they tell you and stick to 
it. They don’t go back on it. And if they don’t want your video they 
will also tell you straight. They don’t tell you what it would take to 
improve the video, make it more Chart Show-worthy, they don’t act 
as video A&R people. 
(Knight 1996a, p.16)
But, as Robert Lemon at Sharp End PR commented, the value of an 
‘exclusive’ could not be overestimated: ‘If your sales people can tell the 
retailers they have a Chart Show exclusive it means something. And once 
you’re given an exclusive it’s usual for the programme to continue their 
coverage if and when the song charts, so that it may get played three 
or four weeks running’ (Knight, 1996a, p.16). Early beneficiaries of this 
exposure in series one (1986) were George Michael (‘A Different Corner’), 
Falco (‘Rock Me Amadeus’) and Peter Gabriel (‘Sledgehammer’ [1986]). 
The show’s validity and vitality, based on its eclecticism and its rigorous 
off-screen selection process, was challenged however, almost as soon as 
it had become established, not from the critics or rival broadcasters, but 
from the music industry itself.
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The British Phonographic Industry (BPI) Dispute
John Cummins had lit the touchpaper in what became an incendiary 
conflict, with comments he made at a workshop organised by the Association 
of Independent Producers, which were reported in Music Week before The 
Chart Show had even begun transmission. Cummins had allegedly accused 
record companies of a lack of investment in music video and of only making 
promos to ‘shut up the artist’. These comments met with a robust reaction 
from John Benedict of Chrysalis Group who insisted that broadcasters like 
Channel 4 should step into line with their European counterparts and 
pay for ‘what is essentially, from your point of view, very cheap material’ 
(Anon., 1986b, p.21). This debate between UK broadcasters and the record 
labels’ trade body, the BPI, had been simmering for some months, but 
the launch of The Chart Show (the first UK music programme to treat 
music videos exclusively as an index of a song/artist’s chart popularity 
and commercial value) brought matters to the boil. The BPI instructed 
its members to cease supplying television companies with free videos after 
31 May 1986. Cummins, at the eye of the storm, retorted that videos 
were promotional tools and that the broadcaster already bore the cost of 
making the programmes on which they were shown. The BPI maintained 
that The Chart Show was getting free content (Wohrle, 1986). Behind the 
rhetoric, both the BBC and Channel 4 waited to see what kind of payment 
BPI might propose. Meanwhile, the ITV companies, including Tyne Tees, 
called the BPI’s bluff by insisting their music programmes could survive 
without videos (Anon., 1986c).
The dispute was evidence of the tacit recognition, by all sides, of the 
increased market value and cultural status of music video in what John 
Mundy called ‘the visual economy of popular music’ (Mundy, 1999, p.243). 
A ‘BPI spokesman’ was quoted in Melody Maker as saying ‘Music videos 
are no longer short simple promos. Today they’re mini epics and their 
use on television is increasing dramatically’ (Anon., 1986d).
The BBC’s Top of the Pops producer Michael Hurll spoke at a seminar 
at the International Music & Media Conference in May 1986 in Montreux 
entitled ‘How well is music being handled by the media?’. He concluded 
that broadcasters were in a cleft stick: ‘TV producers and directors can’t 
compete with the video clip in terms of resources available’ he accepted. 
‘The Tube is one of the best programmes around, but it doesn’t matter 
what you do on TV in pop music. You’ll only get 1–1.5 million people 
watching’ (Anon., 1986e, p.4). The dominance of Top of the Pops’ ‘variety 
show’ formula made competition difficult and alternative programming 
based on video clips was only economically viable if their costs were 
kept down.
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As the BPI deadline loomed, with no agreement in place, the 
temperature of the debate rose. Keith Macmillan of Video Visuals 
requested direct talks with the BPI: ‘I am the one who has to do the 
deals to buy in promos. I am the one that guarantees and indemnifies 
Channel 4 against being sued if something hasn’t been cleared. They 
should be talking to me’. But Patrick Isherwood, legal adviser at the BPI, 
read things differently: ‘Macmillan said he was not prepared to talk unless 
we instructed our members to continue supplying him’. Meanwhile, the 
BBC were brokering a separate agreement with BPI, around a payment 
of £75 per video, and on their acceptance of the principle of payment 
the BPI sanctioned their continued supply (Griffen, 1986, p.3). Rumour 
had it that the BPI were asking for a screening fee of £500 per clip 
(Anon., 1986f, p.4).
Channel 4 defied the ban and put out The Chart Show on the 6 and 
14 June 1986 and broadcast shows that included, in the BPI’s words, ‘a 
large number of videos from several of our members’ (Anon., 1986g, p.1). 
Island Records was one of the major labels who ignored the embargo by 
supplying a 1983 video of Grace Jones performing ‘My Jamaican Guy’ 
which was screened on 6 June. The situation grew more complex when 
Miles Copeland announced that his IRS record label would resign from 
the BPI. In a press statement IRS said it felt that ‘the BPI’s position is 
against the interests of IRS and its artists as it will tend to discourage 
broadcasters from programming adventurous and unproved artists of the 
kind signed to IRS in favour of established artists’ (Anon., 1986g, p.4). 
The BPI responded expressing regret and warning, ‘the council will 
now have to consider whether the actions taken by some members are 
compatible with continued membership’ (p.4). This disquiet within the 
music industry spread further. Miles Clennell of Directors International 
expressed the concerns of video producers: ‘It’s still early days but if it 
dragged on I’d say it would have a serious effect on some of the companies 
who do nothing else but promos. Some could even disappear’ (Anon., 
1986h, p.6). And Richard Bell of Vivid confirmed that the dispute was 
hitting smaller producers hardest because they were less likely to have 
guaranteed American and European sales for their clips. Keith Macmillan 
seized the opportunity to exploit this confusion claiming: ‘The Chart 
Show is a special case; it’s the only show on TV featuring specialist 
music videos and we’re promoting new talent. We’re providing a valuable 
service for the music industry. What the BPI is doing is shooting many 
of its members in the foot!’ (Anon., 1986i).
But having screened two shows after the ban was imposed, Channel 4 
pulled The Chart Show on 20 June 1986. In an internal memo making 
provision to show alternative music content in its regular slot, John 
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Cummins wrote to Colin Leventhal, Channel 4’s Head of Programme 
Acquisition: ‘Wording for this evening’s Presentation – “We are sorry that 
we are not able to bring you THE CHART SHOW this evening because 
of a dispute with the British Phonographic Industry. In the meantime, 
look forward to REWIND”’ (Cummins, 1986, n.p.). In the event, The 
Chart Show wouldn’t run again until 8 August. Whilst the popular music 
press reported discontent in some quarters of the recording industry about 
this embargo, Sounds reminded its readers: ‘Britain is virtually the only 
country where TV stations don’t pay for using videos’ (Anon., 1986j).
The legal battle grew more complex still. Despite Channel 4’s public 
statement that this was a dispute with the BPI, the decision to pull the 
show had been prompted by the intervention of the Musicians’ Union 
(MU). Keith Macmillan complained to Music Week:
The MU has not cleared the promos we were hoping to use, and is 
refusing to do so on the basis that PPL [Phonographic Performance 
Ltd] has not given clearance for the sound recordings […] The MU 
takes the view that a video sound recording is a gramophone record, 
but Channel 4 and I say it’s a soundtrack, and therefore doesn’t need 
PPL clearance. It is at best a dubious legal point […] I have to ask 
who’s losing this battle? The MU have lost payments for members 
this week, and the record companies have lost sales tomorrow – is it 
worth the struggle? 
(Anon., 1986k, p.4)
Having settled an annual flat-rate deal in the region of £150,000 with 
the BBC, and completed an agreement with Tyne Tees by the end of 
June – the first commercial station to accede to the principle of payment 
– the BPI clearly felt this was a worthwhile struggle (Anon., 1986l, p.3). 
By 26 July Music Week reported that the BPI were in negotiation with 
Music Box (ITV, 1984–1987) for their late-night music video show to be 
shown on Yorkshire Television, and even at Channel 4 the producers 
of the Max Headroom Show, Chrysalis Visual Programming, proceeded 
with their forthcoming series on the basis of a separate agreement with 
the BPI. Keith Macmillan’s Chart Show was looking increasingly isolated 
(Anon., 1986m, p.6). On 7 August Channel 4 issued a press release 
announcing the return of The Chart Show on 8 August, following a deal 
with BPI covering the 12 remaining programmes in the series and a 
planned Christmas Special. Again, this was secured by means of a 
blanket payment the details of which remained undisclosed (Channel 4 
Press Release, 1986).
The dispute marked an important staging post in British television’s 
recognition of the status of music video as a commercial and legal 
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entity, as well as an immensely popular aesthetic phenomenon. Firstly, 
the principle of payment for video as programme content rather than 
commercial advertising was conceded, thus bringing British broadcasters 
into line with Europe and the United States. This solidified the synchro-
nisation of sound and music in the unique video format which prevented 
further claims such as those mounted by the MU that the soundtrack 
was a broadcast audio recording. Similarly, on the commercial front, 
whilst the BPI had originally sought deals on a per video basis, the 
agreements with broadcasters brokered during the summer of 1986 all 
resulted in blanket agreements which conformed to television’s established 
content-purchase practices. It was thus, on the finer points of principle, 
that music video in Britain became both formalised as a discrete and 
indivisible audio-visual entity and aggregated as marketable television 
content. This had the dual effect of securing the popularity and value 
to advertisers of television video music shows for the next generation, 
while stimulating the industry’s output of music video and increasing its 
production budgets. By the end the 1980s music video was the essential 
calling card of most music acts with their eye on singles chart success.
Commercial Effects
Whilst The Chart Show and MTV led the way in driving demand for 
music video and increasing production across the board, the effects in the 
late 1980s were mixed. At a conference on Music Television in Europe 
in late September 1988, Nordisk Television’s Lennart Bergvall complained 
that ‘with the advent of music video, the threshold for establishing new 
acts has been raised’ (Laing, 1988, p.23). Kate Phillips, a producer at 
Techniques of Persuasion, celebrated the fact that ‘promos are just about 
the only way left of seeing raw, raw talent […] Literally anyone can walk 
off the street and make a promo – that’s a wonderful, exciting thing’. 
Yet she maintained that ‘record companies view the job as a stone in 
their shoe […] There’s no question that video and visual aspects do 
help to sell a band’s records, but you can’t see it on a returns sheet’ 
(Anon., 1988b, p.34). Nonetheless, by the end of 1988 it was possible to 
measure the effect of The Chart Show in attracting significant audiences 
and in predicting chart-toppers, exposure on the show in ‘The Chart 
Race’ leading in almost every case to an improved chart performance 
the following week and repeat showings helping to prolong the chart life 
of some tracks. And the showcasing of music video on television had an 
impact also on the sell-through music video market where sales increased 
100 per cent between 1987 and the end of 1988 as more domestic 
households acquired VHS players (Anon., 1988c, pp.1, 4). This rate of 
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expansion also led to criticism within the production sector that creative 
talent was not valued in this process. Selina Webb reported: ‘As video 
booms and promos find themselves cropping up in a variety of places, 
some producers are beginning to wonder isn’t it time they got the credit 
and royalties for their work’:
The public spent around £30m on sell through music video tapes in 
1988, while an estimated £10m a year is paid to the record industry 
for the use of pop promos on network and satellite TV across Europe 
– with not a penny going to the creative originators of the visuals. 
(Webb, 1989b, p.6)
A fledgling trade body, the Music, Film and Video Producers’ 
Association (MFVPA), was established with the aim of negotiating standard 
contracts with the BPI, yet it struggled to gain adequate representation 
within the cottage industry of video production where record labels 
retained the power. At the same time Webb’s review of the video market 
in 1988 adjudged that ‘cliché-ridden dross has been thick on the ground’ 
despite the ‘explosion in dance music’ extending ‘to video in 1988, 
prompting the year’s only new breed of promo’. And she reflected that 
while ‘independents have commissioned some of the most memorable 
promos of the year, their budgets have often been rock-bottom’. She 
concluded, rather gloomily, that ‘those shrinking budgets and record 
companies’ reluctance to commission until a record seems assured of a 
top 50 chart placing suggests that the industry is struggling to justify 
video’s worth as a marketing tool with the limited broadcast opportunities 
currently available’ (1989a, p.6).
The ITV Chart Show (1989–1998)
The reality of those limitations, in Autumn 1988, had been compounded 
by Channel 4’s decision not to re-commission The Chart Show beyond its 
third series which ended on 30 September. In the Spring of 1988 youth 
commissioner John Cummins left to join Disney, and was replaced by 
Stephen Garrett who, like the channel’s new Chief Executive Michael 
Grade, had experience at Granada and the BBC (Bonner & Aston 
2003, pp.259–260). Yet despite rumours of its demise, Keith Macmillan’s 
Video Visuals (which had since The Chart Show’s success also pioneered 
in partnership with London Weekend Television (LWT) the innovative, 
award-winning youth current affairs show Network 7), was ultimately 
reprieved by Yorkshire Television and promised an ITV network slot on 
Saturday mornings. Macmillan could barely disguise his glee in moving 
to the ‘mainstream’:
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The incredible growth in the pop video market over recent years has 
created a new demand from TV audiences. We’re very pleased that 
ITV is prepared to go for that audience not by competing directly with 
shows like Top of the Pops but by supporting something new, appealing 
and fast-moving. 
(Anon., 1988a, p.1)
The Chart Show’s ITV makeover, which saw Macmillan’s team of Gail 
Screene, Philip Davey, and Suzanne Lewis joined by Flora Andrews, 
included extending the running-time to an hour, screening a repeat on 
Sunday nights, and updating the colourful, trademark graphics, courtesy 
of Louise Hadley’s Dubner computer programme. Yet the format, and the 
audience size, and demographic, remained largely the same. Some industry 
critics were disappointed. Jason Beck at WEA felt it was diminished:
The standard of the programme has fallen since it moved to ITV, but 
it’s largely the record companies’ fault. Instead of going ahead and 
trying new things they think ‘we’d better not do that, perhaps TV 
won’t like it’, when in fact TV wants better standards. 
(Webb, 1989c, p.28)
However, Jeff Goy at RCA Records explained the creative difficulties 
which mitigated against experimentation: ‘We’ve also got to think of 
Top of the Pops, think internationally, and of course what’s right for the 
artist – not all of our artists are suitable for exposure on The Chart Show 
– but it is one of the most important outlets, and occasionally the only 
outlet, so we have to consider it’ (Webb, 1989c, p.28). Director Pedro 
Romhanyi, then of London Records, was more upbeat about its virtues:
The Chart Show is the most modern, comprehensive and varied music 
show on television. Its strength is that it places videos of high production 
value alongside those of earthier virtues – and it’s unmissable. Because it 
is broad in its outlook you don’t have to be restricted in what you do. 
(Webb, 1989c, p.28)
This variety and consequent versatility became an enduring virtue of 
the format. Of the 50 or 60 videos viewed by The Chart Show team 
each week, on average 16 would be played in full, perhaps half of those 
achieving exclusives. Macmillan maintained that they aimed to mix 
chart singles with new and ‘interesting stuff’, that there wasn’t such a 
thing as a Chart Show video, just a ‘good video’ and that the increasing 
emphasis on the chart with the move to ITV was offset by the innovation 
happening in the fields of dance and rock. And he continued to assert 
Video Visuals’ editorial independence: ‘We don’t let anyone plug us. The 
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record companies send the video to us and we either like it or we don’t, 
end of story, no deals’ (Webb, 1989c, p.28). Macmillan’s fierce defence 
of The Chart Show’s editorial independence was especially potent rhetoric 
at a time when MTV’s anti-competition practices were under scrutiny 
and allegations of collusion with major record labels were the subject of 
litigation in the United States (see Banks, 1996).
The Chart Show made an effective transition to ITV and quickly 
established a Saturday morning cultural ritual for the under-30s with 
an ideological insouciance that is every television executive’s dream. As 
David Knight, editor of Promo, reflected:
From that moment it established its huge importance to the record 
industry. Although its audience of around 1.4 million pales in comparison 
to Top of the Pops, its influence on those young music consumers about 
to do their Saturday spending down the record store has never been 
underestimated. 
(1996a, p.15)
The link between video airplay and record sales was confirmed in a 
survey conducted by Promo. 
(Anon., 1998a, p.6)
However, despite (and in part because of ) its influence, the show was soon 
embroiled in fresh controversy and legal disputes. Firstly, some at the 
BBC took umbrage with The Chart Show’s granting of ‘exclusives’. Music 
Week reported that Top of the Pops staff had been accused of ‘leaning 
on pluggers and record companies […] telling pluggers that any videos 
shown exclusively on The Chart Show will not be shown on the BBC 
programme’ (Anon., 1989a, pp.1, 4). Whilst this proved to be no more 
than a flexing of rival muscles, it did have repercussions. VPL (Video 
Performance Ltd – the industry’s video performance licensing body that 
had been established in 1984 as an adjunct to Phonographic Performance 
Ltd, the music industry’s collecting society) issued a public reminder that 
‘the VPL licence to The Chart Show and Top of the Pops is non-exclusive’ 
(Anon., 1989b, p.4) Indeed, while it was MTV in the United States who 
were being accused of monopolistic practices, in the UK it was not the 
shows nor the broadcasters themselves that wielded market power, but 
the industry’s representative bodies.
The BPI and the MU had been at the centre of earlier disputes 
and, since 1988, VPL had introduced a system of tariff collection from 
broadcasters of licence fees for the broadcast of music videos. Following 
its transfer to ITV, Video Visuals had signed an agreement with VPL 
which saw annual fees rise incrementally. By 1993 VPL was demanding 
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a tariff of £450,000 for a ten-month period in 1994 (Clark-Meads & 
Kingston, 1995, p.4). As Music Week reported, although ‘the new tariff 
allows 20% discount for programmes featuring 100% music videos […] 
recently expired agreements with producers such as Video Visuals (Chart 
Show) and Music Box (Raw Power) are understood to have included 
reductions of 50% and more’ (Anon., 1993a, p.1). Keith Macmillan began 
proceedings against VPL at the Copyright Tribunal in June 1993. The 
initial hearing ruled against VPL’s ‘request that […] Video Visuals should 
pay the rate for screening promos which operated in 1992. Instead, Video 
Visuals, which was awarded costs, has been paying a lower interim rate’ 
(Anon., 1993c, p.1). But the dispute rumbled on for almost another two 
years until it was finally resolved in an out-of-court settlement in March 
1995. In reaching a compromise both sides claimed victory. Music Week 
reported that ‘the deal is believed to retain the existing tariff system 
introduced by VPL in 1993, but with an adjusted rate’ (Anon., 1995, 
p.1). Macmillan claimed he had ‘regained the freedom to evolve the 
format of the show. This is a great opportunity to change the pacing, 
introduce new slots and make room in the running order for even more 
videos’ (Anon., 1995, p.1). But a spokesperson for VPL insisted that it 
was only because Video Visuals had made concessions that agreement 
had been possible: ‘This was the first ever acceptable proposal we’ve had 
from Keith Macmillan’ (Clark-Meads, 1995, p.46). Whatever the truth, 
once again legal and commercial dispute wrought aesthetic changes in 
television presentation.
The cost-effective changes involved showing fewer, but shorter clips, 
‘extending the video content of the Chart News section from three videos 
to six, and the Next Week section at the end of the show [to] three clips 
instead of one’ (Clark-Meads, 1995, p.46). It was reported that further 
format changes, including new 3D graphics, were under discussion with 
the ITV network. Change had been a constant of The Chart Show in the 
early 1990s, beginning with sponsorship deals first with Pepe jeans and 
then Twix (Mars Confectionery), leading to a revision of the opening titles 
and bumpers (Anon., 1993b, p.3). A year after the VPL agreement, Keith 
Macmillan was promising ‘a gutsier, more mature show after a £250,000 
revamp’ for May 1996, to coincide with the show’s tenth anniversary. 
Aside from a graphics makeover (employing Louise Hadley’s Lightwave 
software and a dramatic black-screen opening accompanied by Philip 
Davey’s new theme tune and sound effects), the show’s data collection 
(by now a telephone poll of retail outlets rather than radio airplay) was 
augmented by collecting up to 11am on a Saturday morning. And the 
new show featured ‘Demo Corner, in which new unsigned bands get the 
chance to have their home-made videos shown’ (Davey, 1998, p.26), and 
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included a new interactive ‘battle of the bands’ feature which enabled 
viewers to vote for a choice of two videos with the results revealed at 
the end of each show. Additionally, Des Burkinshaw’s off-screen interviews 
and on-screen ‘gossip’, fleshed out the ‘notorious info-boxes’ (p.26). Most 
important of all, the new format would go out ‘live’, with part three 
being edited while parts one and two were on air. This innovation was, 
Macmillan claimed ‘the beginning of the age of desktop broadcasting’ 
(Knight, 1996a, p.15).
Pluggers responded positively to the changes. Matt Connolly of Fleming 
Molloy commented: ‘As long as they continue with four or five exclusive 
slots it will continue to be a great vehicle for us, but making it more 
interactive with the audience will be useful because you get a better idea of 
what people want’ (Eade, 1996, p.1). And record companies acknowledged 
its domestic power. Mike O’Keefe of Sony Music remarked: ‘We don’t 
specifically commission for The Chart Show, but for the commercial viability 
of a video it is certainly taken into consideration. And for the UK, 
before you make it on MTV and The Box, it is still the only yardstick 
by which videos are measured’ (Knight, 1996a, p.15).
Editorially, The Chart Show’s independence remained a source of pride 
on its tenth anniversary. Philip Davey reflected:
On the surface of it, it’s just a bunch of videos thrown together but, 
because we were promo makers, there’s a certain amount of care and 
love that goes into it. The artists see the importance of the show. We’ve 
helped quite a lot of new bands over the years and that’s incredibly 
satisfying to me. 
(Anon., 1996c, p.4)
As well as assisting artists, The Chart Show’s virtual video monopoly 
on UK terrestrial television promoted directorial talent, raised the profile 
of particular production companies (such as Oil Factory and Black Dog) 
and increased competition within the production sector. In 1995 ‘the top 
ten companies increased their share of Chart Show airplay from 58 per 
cent to 61 per cent and UK production companies captured 66 per cent 
of all airplay (compared with 31 per cent for US companies)’ (Anon., 
1996a, p.11). The partnership of Dom & Nic (then Hammer & Tongs) 
were the most-shown directors on The Chart Show in 1996 (Knight, 1997, 
p.23). In the same year the Brit Awards Best Video by A British Artist 
winner was decided by a phone vote of Chart Show viewers, the show 
itself running short extracts from all the nominees between 20 January 
and 17 February (Anon., 1996b, p.8). By this time The Chart Show was 
being shown in 15 countries. The following year Promo reported that 
‘there were only two Chart Shows screened in 1997 that did not feature 
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the work of an Oil Factory director’ (Anon., 1998b, p.24). In April 1998 
the same journal observed:
The battle for exclusives had led to The Chart Show becoming more 
adventurous in its programming which has led to quality videos for 
less familiar names such as David Holmes, Libido, Pressure Drop, 
The Unbelievable Truth, Gomez and Pitchshifter, picking up precious 
screenings. The programme has arguably held on to its audience share 
by screening the best promos available. 
(Anon., 1998d, p.11)
Despite its terrestrial market dominance in music video, by 1998 the 
advent of MTV UK and The Box was clearly changing the dynamics 
if not the fortunes of The Chart Show. David Knight reported ‘It is the 
ITV Network, which has recently renewed The Chart Show contract for a 
12th year, which is the motivating force behind the quest for exclusives’ 
(Knight, 1998a, p.26). Producer Philip Davey was, according to Promo, 
‘aware that the capacity to get exclusives is somewhat under threat by 
MTV’s UK policy to ask for videos well upfront of the [single] release 
date, in the same way that singles are released to radio’. Knight reflected: 
‘In a way, MTV UK has exploited the advantage of being a full network 
in addition to the limitations of The Chart Show’s remit: the fact that the 
ITV Network demands The Chart Show get exclusives, but generally wants 
them close to a single’s release date’ (p.26).
The Chart Show’s position was further called into question by the 
surprise decision of Keith Macmillan, its creator, to leave in March 
1998, replaced as Executive Producer by Gail Screene. But the same 
press release reported the show’s viewing figures had almost doubled 
since its tenth anniversary refit (Anon., 1998c, pp.4–5). Four months later, 
ITV Network executive Nigel Pickard announced a new look Saturday 
morning schedule featuring a children’s entertainment show fronted by 
Ant and Dec called SMTV Live. The Chart Show aired for the last time 
on Saturday 22 August 1998. The company Macmillan founded with 
Screene and Davey, Video Visuals, continued trading on its established 
strength in television animation graphics until in May 2002 Macmillan 
launched a digital network Chart Show TV which quickly expanded to 
embrace children’s TV, music, and movies.
Conclusion – The Chart Show’s Legacy
The demise of The Chart Show from its commanding position as the 
dominant British music video programme in 1998 can be seen as symbolic 
of the broader decline in UK terrestrial television chart pop music shows 
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(Top of the Pops would end its monumental 42-year run eight years later in 
2006), but it also marked a return to live performance shows over video 
formats across broadcast schedules. But the end of this particular era should 
also be understood within the context of developments in the music video 
industry. As David Knight reported, one change was ‘the increasingly 
common policy of making promos for priority acts way up-front instead 
of waiting to see what response a single gets and rushing to complete 
a video for the week of release’ (Knight, 1998b, p.6). Although music 
video budgets were constrained by the recession of the early 1990s, by 
the end of the decade established artists could still command budgets of 
over £100,000 with the promise of wide international exposure via the 
proliferation of digital outlets (including in the UK, MTV, VH-1, and The 
Box). Another related trend was the reduction in new entry budgets (in 
the £10,000–£20,000 bracket) (p.6). At the same time, The Chart Show’s 
disappearance from the terrestrial schedules marked the beginnings of 
a greater diversification in music video consumption which has resulted 
in the current dominance of online outlets at the expense of the once 
mighty satellite and cable providers (most notably MTV itself ). During 
what has rightly been seen as a golden age of British music video, The 
Chart Show for many years occupied an unrivalled place in respect of 
audience habits and industry schedules alike. And its innovative format 
made it a television vehicle ideally suited to its content. There is no doubt 
that whilst music video as a form has continued to flourish despite the 
changing technologies of the popular music economy, the durability of 
that form in the UK and beyond, aesthetically, commercially, and legally, 
owes much to the function of The Chart Show in consolidating its status.
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